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David Colet
Harold Hongju Koh has written a truly conservative book that conserv-
atives will truly dislike. Some will dislike it because it portrays Oliver
North not as a national hero, but as a subversive radical who did more to
undermine the democratic processes of our government than the Commu-
nists or Sandinistas ever have. But Koh's book will also disturb conserva-
tives who distance themselves from North. In Koh's eyes, North's trans-
gressions were not the isolated acts of a rogue agent, but a synecdoche for
the executive branch's political assault on the Constitution. North's acts
were premised on the view that the executive is the "sole organ" of the
foreign affairs power.' Koh demonstrates that this view, generally pro-
pounded by conservatives,2 is in fact a radical perspective that wQuld have
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t Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Staff Attorney, Center for Constitu-
tional Rights. I would like to thank Jules Lobel, Nina Pillard, and my editor, Alex Whiting, for their
helpful comments and suggestions.
1. The phrase comes from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936), a case North expressly relied upon in justifying his actions before the congressional Iran-
Contra Committee. Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on
Secret Militarv Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Comm. to
Imne,,tigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1987) (testimony of
North).
2. See, e.g., Cheney, Clarifying Legislative and Executive Roles in Covert Operations, GEO. MA-
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shocked the Constitution's Framers, to whom those same conservatives
purport to pay great deference.
The Framers were deeply suspicious of men who, like Oliver North,
would arrogate policymaking authority to themselves in the face of popu-
lar democratic opposition. While the Framers did not foresee the precise
threat posed by National Security Council staff, they did locate such a
threat in the executive branch. They therefore limited the executive to
implementing laws and policies dictated by Congress, the most representa-
tive branch, in both internal and external affairs. And they assigned to
Congress the most important of all national security and foreign policy
authorities: the power to declare war.
When conservatives discuss the foreign affairs power, however, they
tend to leave the Framers' intent behind. Instead, they sound either like
liberals, urging that we look to how the Constitution has evolved through
a history of executive aggrandizement, or like legal realists or critical legal
studies scholars, advancing a realpolitik analysis that whatever the Con-
stitution says, political necessity mandates unilateral executive action in
foreign affairs.3
SON L. REv., Fall 1988, at 203; Turner, Separation of Powers in Foreign Policy: The Theoretical
Underpinnings, GEo. MASON L. REV., Fall 1988, at 97. See generally Foreign Affairs and the
Constitution: The Roles of Congress, the President, and the Courts, 43 U. MIAMi L. REV. 1 (1988)
(Federalist Society Symposium).
3. As Peter Weiss wrote, commenting on a symposium entitled Legal and Policy Issues in the
Iran-Contra Affair: Intelligence Oversight in a Democracy, published in the Houston International
Law Journal:
The general theme running through the presentations, enunciated on behalf of those charged
with-or charging themselves with-carrying out covert operations, is DON'T FENCE ME
IN. The theme is played alternately in a scholarly (Van Cleve), querulous (Fein), aggressive
(Gray), vitriolic (Turner), conciliatory (Rindskopf) and mellowly reminiscing (Pforzheimer)
mode, but the message throughout is loud and clear: These are dangerous times; "special activ-
ities" are a risky business; Congress can neither be trusted to keep secrets nor to
"micromanage" foreign affairs. Ergo, while going through the motions of oversight may be a
necessary concession to popular concern and congressional pride, the mechanics of oversight
should be kept to a bare minimum.
Weiss, If the News Offends You, Kill the Messenger: A Comment on the U.H. Law Center/A.B.A.
Iran-Contra Symposium, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 355, 355 (1989); see also S. REP. No. 220, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) (noting that in hearings on War Powers Act, supporters cited intent of
Framers while opponents cited historical evidence of unilateral presidential military action and need
for rapid action in nuclear age).
Some conservatives do attempt to maintain both the appearance of fidelity to original intent and the
position that the executive should exercise unilateral foreign affairs power, but this requires an ex-
tremely strained reading of the Framers. Thus, for example, then-Vice President George Bush, ad-
dressing the Federalist Society in the midst of the Iran-Contra controversy, argued that the problem in
foreign affairs was too much congressional oversight, not too little, and invoked the Framers for sup-
port: "My understanding is that Hamilton and the founders fought to focus the conduct of our foreign
policy in one man, the president, so that we as a nation would be able to act quickly, decisively, and
where necessary, secretly to achieve his goals." Vice President George Bush's Remarks to the Federal-
ist Society 4 (Jan. 30, 1987) (transcipt on file with author). In fact, Hamilton argued of the treaty
power, a crucial element of foreign policy, that it would be "imprudent to confide in [the President]
solely so important a trust." THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Bush's verbal slip from "we as a nation" to "his [the President's] goals" demonstrates perfectly why




Koh's The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the
Iran-Contra Affair,4 by contrast, is truly conservative, in the sense that it
reaffirms a traditional notion: The foreign affairs power, like virtually all
other authorities in our constitutional structure of government, is "a
power shared" by all the branches. Koh maintains that this principle, so
fundamental to the founding of our national government, is a prerequisite
to a sound, democratic foreign policy. The Constitution's checks and bal-
ances are just as critical to forestalling abuse of power in foreign affairs as
in domestic policy. The requirement that foreign policy initiatives be the
product of shared power is designed to ensure that our foreign policy re-
flects a broad national consensus.
Since the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, however, the
executive has launched an effort to undermine the principle of shared
power by openly asserting and covertly exercising unilateral foreign policy
authority. Koh argues that the Iran-Contra affair reflects the extent to
which the executive has seized unilateral power, and he suggests wide-
ranging reforms to resurrect the balance of power. His is a work of resto-
ration rather than revolution. The revolution-or, more accurately, the
coup-has already taken place.
No one disputes that the executive's powers in foreign affairs have
mushroomed dramatically since the founding of our country, a develop-
ment matched in intensity perhaps only by the sheer volume of commen-
tary on the subject.' Koh's book stands out from this mass of scholarship,
however, in its clarity, its breadth of vision, and its common sense. This
compelling position paper for the restoration of a working balance should
be read by all those, in government or out, who want to address the insti-
tutional problems so starkly exemplified by the Iran-Contra affair. Koh
provides the comprehensive perspective too often wanting in the piecemeal
reforms that usually follow a disaster like the Iran-Contra affair.
Although much of Koh's argument attacks the unaccountable, unilateral
decision-making that marked the Reagan era, Koh does appear to share
one trait with the former President: irrepressible optimism. Koh spends
many pages describing Congress' past attempts to recover its authority in
the national security context through "framework legislation," all of
which turned out to be in vain. His prescription, however, is for more of
the same: a new, improved, more comprehensive framework. I am far less
sanguine.
I read Koh's book from the point of view of a litigator who has been
involved in a series of dramatically unsuccessful challenges to unilateral
4. H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR (1990) [hereinafter by page number only].
5. "Perhaps not since the Volstead Act ushered in the Prohibition Era has a federal law been
talked about more and respected less than the War Powers Resolution of 1973." San Francisco Daily
Banner J., Nov. 30, 1977, at I, col. 6.
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executive foreign affairs actions during the Reagan presidency.6 From that
perspective, I wholeheartedly concur in Koh's account of the Iran-Contra
affair as only the latest manifestation of a consistent pattern of executive
lawbreaking, congressional acquiescence, and judicial toleration.7 Major
changes are necessary to stem this pattern, but many of Koh's prescrip-
tions for change within the legislative and executive branches are either
double-edged or insufficient.
In the end, Koh's most important proposal concerns legislation to invite
judicial involvement in foreign affairs disputes. But Koh's proposed invita-
tion to the courts is too broad. The judiciary's role must be carefully cir-
cumscribed if we expect it to exercise anything other than rubber-stamp
review. If the judiciary is limited in the first instance to procedural over-
sight and asked simply to ensure that foreign policy decisions are made
pursuant to democratic processes, judicial oversight might indirectly help
to bring our foreign policy in line with substantive democratic principles.
I. LESSONS FROM OLLIE
Reportedly, one of the more compelling moments during Oliver North's
criminal trial was his presentation to the jury of his "save the Contras"
sales pitch. With a slide show and abundant misinformation, North urged
the jury, in Dale Carnegie style, to dig down deep and support a Contra
today so that the Sandinistas would not overrun the United States to-
morrow. The jury's verdict suggests that it was somewhat more discrimi-
nating than North's wealthier audiences.
Koh argues that we, too, need to be more discriminating in the lessons
we draw from Oliver North. In the Iran-Contra affair, members of the
executive branch lied to Congress and the American people, negotiated
with terrorists, diverted funds, and engaged in a wide range of criminal
activity in order to provide support to the contras-support which Con-
6. Virtually from the outset of the Reagan Administration's forays into Central America, the
Center for Constitutional Rights sought to challenge those actions in court. I was involved in all of
those challenges, which included Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (suit under
War Powers Act challenging President's dispatch of military advisers to El Salvador); Sanchez-Espi-
noza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (challenging human rights violations by Contras and
unilateral executive support thereof); Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (suit under
Ethics in Government Act seeking appointment of Special Prosecutor to investigate criminal violations
by President Reagan and National Security Council in supporting Contras); Beacon Products Corp. v.
Reagan, 814 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1987) (challenge to constitutionality of trade embargo against Nicara-
gua); Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (suit by U.S. citizens living in Nicaragua to require United States to honor World Court in-
junction against military aid to Contras). The only two challenges which were successful were Barnes
v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (successful challenge to President Reagan's pocket veto of
legislation requiring certification that human rights were improving in El Salvador), vacated as moot,
479 U.S. 361 (1987); and Veterans Peace Convoy v. Schultz, 722 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Tex. 1988)
(successful challenge to U.S. Customs' attempt to halt humanitarian aid being shipped to Nicaragua).
7. In fact, it is not even the most recent example, as President Bush has provided yet another in
the invasion of Panama. See Draper, The Constitution in Danger, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Mar. 1, 1990,
at 41, 46-47.
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gress had specifically prohibited, but which President Reagan wanted to
continue. When news of the affair broke, the press and Congress focused
principally on whether President Reagan knew (or could remember) what
was going on in his basement, where the National Security Council is
housed. Koh urges a broader view of North's actions as symptomatic of
the pitfalls of unilateral executive foreign affairs power. He argues per-
suasively that the Iran-Contra affair should have been treated not as an-
other Watergate, in which the inquiry was appropriately directed toward
the "smoking" tapes, but as another Vietnam, in which the inquiry and
response were ultimately more structural in nature. The important ques-
tion was not who knew what and when did they forget it, but how did we
reach such a state of affairs in a purportedly constitutional democracy.
Koh criticizes the focus of each of the three governmental inquiries in
the Iran-Contra affair. The first, the Tower Commission, was an execu-
tive initiative, and therefore it is hardly surprising that it failed to identify
unilateral executive power as the root of the problem. The Tower Com-
mission's purpose was damage control; it sought to reinforce rather than
to challenge presidential prerogative.' It characterized the Iran-Contra af-
fair as an aberration, specifically rejected any need for legislative reform,
and limited its critique to management style, a "problem" that, not coinci-
dentally, could be dealt with by the executive branch itself.
The second inquiry, run by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh,
was equally limited. The initial indictments, charging conspiracy to de-
fraud the United States by conducting a covert, illegal, foreign policy,
promised to put on trial the very notion of unilateral executive foreign
policy actions. Ironically, however, the covert nature of the policy frus-
trated the attempt to subject its architects to criminal prosecution. Because
proving such a covert foreign policy appeared to require the introduction
in open court of secret information, the Independent Counsel was forced
to drop the broad charges and to proceed with more routine charges of
graft and perjury.9
8. P. 15.
9. The peculiar relationship between the Independent Counsel and the executive branch allowed
the latter to set up a number of logistical roadblocks that to date have ensured that at best a very
limited version of the truth would come out in the Iran-Contra trials. The purpose of an Independent
Counsel is to investigate and prosecute criminal activity by high-level executive officials and to avoid
the conflict of interest posed by the Attorney General, the nation's top law enforcement officer, inves-
tigating and prosecuting his client, the President. Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598
(1982); H.R. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). But even though the executive branch
was not running the Iran-Contra prosecution, it appears to have done all it could to control and limit
the prosecution's scope.
The executive argued that the statute creating the Independent Counsel was unconstitutional be-
cause prosecution was an exclusively executive prerogative. It successfully opposed attempts to have
President Reagan and Vice President Bush testify in North's trial and blocked the production of
Reagan's diaries in Poindexter's trial. And it appears to have abused its authority over classified
information to bar the introduction of assertedly secret information at several trials. See, e.g., Use of
Secret Data Barred in Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 1; Case Dismissed in Contra
Affair, Clearing Agent, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Some of the information that the
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Koh correctly suggests that a forum to determine individual criminal
liability is not the ideal locus for an inquiry into the structure of govern-
ment.x" From Koh's vantage point, the congressional hearing before the
Iran-Contra committee presented the ideal forum." Congress had both
the institutional incentive to investigate the affair as a separation of pow-
ers problem and the ability to pass structural legislation to attempt to
resolve it. But the committee got off on the wrong foot, Koh argues, by
treating the affair as another Watergate. 2 The official committee report
reflects the committee's misguided decision to focus on factual rather than
structural issues: It devotes 690 pages to recounting the facts and only
four and one-half pages to recommendations for legislative reform. Its few
reforms appear in disjointed fashion, without any systematic analysis of
their purpose or effect.' 3 And it undercuts even these modest proposals by
stating that the need is "not for new laws but for a renewal of the com-
mitment to constitutional government and sound processes of decision
making."' 4
In Koh's view, President Reagan and Oliver North were no innovators;
they simply followed in the footsteps of some of their more illustrious ex-
ecutive forebearers.'6 Koh retraces the history of executive circumvention
of congressional restrictions on foreign policy and demonstrates that the
only Presidents who did not seek to circumvent Congress were those
whom we now view as weak: Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, and
William Howard Taft. Until recent times, however, presidential usurpa-
tion of Congress' role was treated much like adultery; it was widely prac-
ticed but rarely admitted and never openly condoned. Before the Korean
War, the executive branch rarely openly asserted an inherent foreign af-
fairs power.'" Although Presidents frequently initiated foreign affairs ac-
Justice Department would not allow to be divulged had already been revealed during the congres-
sional hearings and was common knowledge in the media. Thornburgh Accused of Deliberate Delays,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1989, at A21, col. 1 (Independent Counsel Walsh accuses Attorney General
Thornburgh of "repeatedly thwart[ing]" prosecution of CIA agent Joseph Fernandez "by last-minute,
unannounced procedural maneuvers designed only to tie this case in a knot of endless litigation," and
maintains that information Thornburgh seeks to protect "is widely known to the public"). Thus, it is






14. HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN & SEN-
ATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSI-
TION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S.
REP. No. 216, H.R. REP. No. 433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 423 (1987).
15. Pp. 38-64.
16. See Firmage, Rogue Presidents and the War Power of Congress, GEO. MASON L. REV., Fall
1988, at 79, 82; Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55
VA. L. REV. 1243, 1253-65 (1969). Koh and Professor Jules Lobel date the beginnings of unilateral
executive exercise of foreign affairs power to the turn of the century, with the United States' rise to an
imperial power. Pp. 88-89; Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J.
1385, 1398-99 (1989).
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tions unilaterally, they generally sought congressional ratification soon
thereafter, or argued that their actions were short of war and therefore did
not require congressional approval. Moreover, throughout our nation's
first century, the courts reviewed suits involving military and foreign af-
fairs on the merits, and held executive conduct in that realm illegitimate if
unauthorized by Congress. 1 For much of our country's history, in other
words, all three branches operated with the understanding that the foreign
affairs authority was "a power shared."
That understanding was first openly challenged in 1950, when Presi-
dent Truman unilaterally committed 83,000 United States troops to fight
the North Koreans and became the first President to assert inherent exec-
utive power to conduct a war without congressional authorization. The
Supreme Court indirectly rebuffed President Truman's claims of inherent
power by invalidating his seizure of a steel mill in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 8 despite his claim that the seizure was necessary to
the military effort. Truman's unprecedented assertion of unilateral au-
thority thus led to the strongest judicial statement to the contrary on rec-
ord. Administrations after Truman's, however, have consistently claimed
and exercised unilateral foreign affairs power, and the courts have done
little to stop them. 9
Presidential usurpation reached crisis proportions in the Vietnam War
and Watergate, prompting Congress to fight back. Congress enacted a se-
ries of statutes designed to reassert and formalize its role in foreign af-
fairs.20 The War Powers Act,2 ' for example, was designed to get Congress
back into the business of declaring (or not declaring) war, and was
designed particularly to forestall the type of creeping involvement that
characterized the Vietnam War. Congress sought to reclaim its emergency
powers by passing the National Emergencies Act2 2 and the International
Economic Emergency Powers Act.2" The Case-Zablocki Act24 attempted
to restrict executive attempts to bypass the Senate's treaty ratification
powers by obligating the President to notify the Senate of all international
agreements. Other laws addressed the allocation of congressional and ex-
17. Pp. 81-83, 92.
18. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19.
Since World War II we have engaged in overt and covert war and acts of war, often initiated
by the president without the authorization of Congress. By presidential directive we have con-
ducted full-scale war; initiated coups; mined harbors; encouraged political assassination; aided
insurrection and sabotage; trained, equipped, and set loose our own brigands and terrorists;
and responded to terrorist acts against our citizens by executively approved reprisals.
Firmage, supra note 16, at 79.
20. Pp. 38-64, 104.
21. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
22. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982).
23. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982); Pp. 47-49.
24. 1 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988).
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ecutive authority over arms sales, foreign trade, military aid, and domestic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.
25
As Koh demonstrates in the most devastating chapter of his book, how-
ever, all of these laudable attempts to rein in the Presidency were frus-
trated by new strategies of executive circumvention. 26 The War Powers
Act is a good example. The heart of that Act is a sixty-day automatic
termination period, triggered by a presidential report to be submitted
whenever troops have been introduced into a situation of "imminent hos-
tilities." Since the Act's passage in 1973, Presidents have committed
armed forces to El Salvador, Grenada, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and
Panama, where they have inflicted and suffered hundreds of casualties.
President Reagan conducted an extended war in Nicaragua by proxy, us-
ing a "private" army trained, directed, and supported by the CIA. Not
once, however, has a President filed the required report.27 The courts
have been unwilling to get involved, 8 and now virtually all agree that the
War Powers Act has failed.29
When viewed from the vantage point of this history of executive avoid-
ance of congressional oversight, the Iran-Contra affair is no aberration.
On the contrary, it fits all too comfortably into "the pattern of history"
that Koh reveals:
In short, Congress's postwar efforts to enact legislation that would
stop the last war simply channeled executive action into new, unreg-
ulated forms of warfare. In a familiar regulatory pattern, each suc-
ceeding congressional effort to catch up with executive evasion of its
legislative controls served only to shift executive activity into a new
pattern of evasion."0
It remains to be seen whether Congress's response to the Iran-Contra
affair will replicate its response to Vietnam. On the one hand, history
suggests that Congress will be sparked by the affair to address through
legislation some of the problems revealed. On the other hand, the same
25. P. 46.
26. Pp. 38-64.
27. Presidents have sent "communications" and informal reports to Congress, but have consist-
ently declined to file the particular report that triggers the termination period. See Ratner & Cole,
The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 715,
742-50 (1984).
28. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lowry v. Reagan, 676
F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987), appeal dismissed per curiam, No. 87-5426 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1988).
29. Koh tells a similar story about the treaty power. Under the Constitution, the President cannot
enter into a treaty without Senate ratification. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. To avoid this inconvenience,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt dramatically expanded the practice of "executive agreements."
In 1972, Congress passed the Case-Zablocki Act, which simply required the President to notify Con-
gress of all executive agreements. Presidents have developed a number of Orwellian methods to avoid
even that mild directive, however, including the "nonagreement agreement," the "voluntary export
restraint," unilateral statements that the United States would comply with unratified treaties, and
treaty reinterpretation. Pp. 41-43.
30. Pp. 62-63.
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history predicts that such efforts will ultimately prove futile.3 ' Koh asks
us to suspend disbelief in order to consider some possible reforms.
II. KOH'S MODEST PROPOSAL AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The consistency with which Presidents have managed to bypass con-
gressional constraints in foreign affairs, Koh argues, demands that we re-
examine the structural characteristics and institutional incentives of the
three branches.32 What is it about these institutions that frustrates every
attempt to vest Congress with foreign affairs authority and responsibility?
Why does "the president almost always seem to win in foreign affairs?" 3
Political analysts have long recognized that the executive is more suited
to initiate foreign policy measures and to respond quickly to international
events. Koh suggests that this institutional advantage is exacerbated by the
United States' declining position in contemporary global politics: "Put
simply, America's declining role as world hegemon has forced changes in
the postwar structure of international institutions, which have in turn
stimulated further presidential initiatives." 34 Our role as an engaged par-
ticipant in new multilateral regimes appears to require ongoing diplomacy
particularly suited to executive action. Professor Jules Lobel has argued
that since the beginning of the Cold War, our government has operated in
a state of perpetual crisis, and that in crises the public most often looks to
the President to lead.35
Koh notes that Congress, as a broadly representative body, is ill-suited
to take emergency action in foreign affairs and, like the public, it often
looks to the President for leadership.3" At least formally, Congress can act
only through legislation, which, if it challenges presidential action, re-
quires a two-thirds vote to survive a veto. 37 Congress is frequently de-
31. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, Dec. 12, 1989, at 023 (describing legislation enacted in response
to Iran-Contra affair); Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1989, at A16 (enactment of law creating position of
outside inspector general to oversee CIA). But see Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1989, at A58 (intelli-
gence committees drop key reforms proposed in wake of Iran-Contra affair that would have required
presidential approval and notification to Congress of covert operations); Washington Post, Oct. 27,
1989, at Al (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence drops demand for requirement that President
notify it within 48 hours of all covert operations, in exchange for President Bush's voluntary pledge to




35. Lobel, supra note 16, at 1399-1412. The extent of the change that has occurred since 1950 is
demonstrated by comparing Professor Lobel's article to Clinton Rossiter's book Constitutional Dicta-
tor.,hip, written in 1948. At that time, Mr. Rossiter reported, crisis government was extremely rare in
the United States. Rossiter wrote that "[sitrong government and abnormal government alike are
anathema to the traditional American philosophy of politics," and that the Constitution "has created
in the American people whether ruled or ruling ... a widespread belief that there is something
e(sentially wrong about emergency government." C. RossITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP
210-11 (1948).
36. Pp. 123-33.
37. For example, when Congress recently sought to assert itself with respect to United States-
China relations after the Tiananmen Square massacre by passing a bill to protect Chinese students in
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railed by special interest groups and often responds to public outcry with
symbolic action rather than substantive reform. 8
For its part, the judiciary is generally unwilling to play a responsible
foreign affairs role. 9 When confronted with executive circumvention of
congressional and constitutional mandates in the foreign affairs context,
the courts either decline to rule altogether or rule for the President. The
judiciary appears to believe that in this realm, politics rather than law
should govern. Whether a court declines to hear a controversy or simply
rubber-stamps the President's action, the effect is the same: It leaves the
political status quo unaltered.
Koh argues that if change is to succeed, foreign-affairs reforms must
address these institutional roots of the problem. His guiding principle is
that all three branches should share authority and responsibility for for-
eign affairs. Therefore, Koh maintains, the President must yield some of
his or her de facto power, Congress should assert its constitutional respon-
sibility, and the judiciary must insist that law play a role in this political
arena.
The mechanism Koh proposes to attain this sea-change in the status
quo is "framework" legislation, by which he means legislation designed to
establish a procedure for implementing the constitutional balance of
power.4 Like many of the structural reform bills passed in the wake of
Watergate and Vietnam, the War Powers Act is a paradigmatic example
of framework legislation. It sought to redress a constitutional imbalance in
the exercise of war powers by reasserting Congress' role through a proce-
dural framework. As Koh demonstrates, however, the War Powers Act
and many other framework laws have proved to be dismal failures, unable
to forestall repeated presidential end-runs.
Koh argues that we need a broader framework, a comprehensive na-
tional security "charter" that would address the whole range of foreign
policy issues from a "shared power" perspective-something of an Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act for foreign affairs.4 ' Otherwise, he predicts,
"interstitial efforts to amend particular foreign-affairs laws will inevitably
fail, serving only to push executive conduct toward new statutory lacunae
and pockets of unregulated activity." '42
As the Internal Revenue Code makes clear, however, comprehensive
the United States, President Bush's veto was sustained even though he had the support of only 62 of
the 535 members of Congress. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1990, § 4, at 3, col. 4.
38. However, President Bush's self-styled "visceral" reaction to Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct.
2533 (1989), the Supreme Court's flag desecration decision, not to mention eight years of President
Reagan, suggests that Presidents are at least as likely to substitute symbol for substance in the search
for a good sound bite. And, as President Bush's opposition to gun control legislation demonstrates,
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legislative efforts cannot close all interstitial loopholes. This is particularly
true where the party to be regulated has demonstrated facility at reinter-
preting or ignoring clear statutory directives,43 and asserting exclusive,
unilateral authority. Even if Congress were capable of enacting compre-
hensive legislation from the overarching perspective Koh offers, what is to
stop Presidents from acting first, notifying later, and simply refusing to
abide by the statute's terms, as they have done in the war powers area?
The history of framework legislation suggests that the problem is not so
much in the drafting as in the enforcement. If Congress were to pass an
airtight Internal Revenue Code, but the courts announced that they would
no longer adjudicate violations, the problem of tax evasion would not be
solved. Koh recognizes that the balance will not be restored until Congress
asks the courts to play a role, and the courts have the courage to respond.
Even if Congress followed all of Koh's suggestions for reforming executive
and congressional roles, its efforts would likely fail without properly cir-
cumscribed judicial participation.
Unenforced framework legislation, moreover, can generate perverse ef-
fects. Enacted to rectify executive encroachment on Congress' powers, it
may well have the practical effect of legitimizing the encroachment, sim-
ply by recognizing its existence in legislation. For example, the War Pow-
ers Act has been read to authorize executive-initiated actions of up to
sixty days. Thus, in building a structural response to the reality of execu-
tive unilateral action, Congress arguably legitimated and perpetuated that
reality.
44
Before turning to the broader problem of unenforced legislation, how-
ever, I will briefly address some of Koh's specific proposals for reform
directed at the executive and legislative branches. While many of these
proposals are sound, many are also paradoxical and underscore the funda-
mental difficulty of involving the most representative branch in foreign
affairs.
To address executive adventurism, Koh proposes several measures to
43. The Boland Amendment is a perfect example. Passed to forbid all government support of the
Contras, it was grossly misinterpreted or ignored by the White House. Because the measure clearly
forbade CIA support, the White House designated the National Security Council to provide the sup-
port instead. When President Reagan was asked, in a deposition for the criminal trial of Admiral
Poindexter, to explain his interpretation of the Boland Amendment, he responded:
I remember being told that there were certain levels of government or agencies and so forth
that were not prohibited by the Boland Amendment, and I remember that. And this was in
connection with my telling us that we must stay within the law and so forth. And I never
challenged or questioned what I was told about that or something else because, not being a
lawyer myself, but being surrounded by a number of them in government, I figured that I was
hearing the truth when they told me that something could be done and still be exempt from the
Boland Amendment.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
44. See Lobel, supra note 16, at 1409 ("By providing legislation to address every conceivable
emergency situation, emergency power inevitably becomes routinized, normal, and by definition,
lawful.").
1990] 2073
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 2063
increase the executive's internal and external accountability."5 Congress'
weaknesses, however, are far more troubling than the President's
strengths. As a result, it is to Congress that Koh primarily directs his
book; his call for framework legislation is essentially a plea to Congress to
pull itself up by its bootstraps. That Koh relies on the assertiveness of the
branch that has given up its powers is a sign of his optimism. But it is
also the only way to solve the problem, because we cannot expect the
President to hand over the reins, and the judiciary has shown no inclina-
tion to alter the status quo on its own. Moreover, Congress has to take on
the responsibility itself; as the Framers unwittingly demonstrated, merely
giving Congress greater substantive powers is not sufficient.
Koh suggests that an important reason Congress fails to hold its own in
foreign affairs is its diffused responsibility and power.4 He proposes to
mitigate this by creating centralized foreign policy expertise in a core con-
sultative committee, and by appointing a congressional legal adviser who
would monitor the President's foreign affairs actions, respond to presiden-
tial reports and findings, and spur Congress to vote on matters that re-
quire its input.4 In other words, Koh proposes making Congress look and
act more like the President. This type of reform, however, is inherently
problematic, for it is precisely because Congress is not like the President
that the Framers initially gave it the lion's share of the power .4  A core
consultative committee is less representative of the nation than the Presi-
45. Pp. 161-66. Internally, he would mandate interagency review of legal opinions that authorize
covert actions, and would require intelligence findings to be signed by the Attorney General as well as
the President, in the hope that the Attorney General would be more attentive than executive policy-
makers to the legality of particular actions. To augment external accountability, he suggests that legal
opinions justifying covert actions be transmitted to the congressional intelligence committees. To in-
crease the political accountability of the National Security Assistant, Koh suggests that the Vice Presi-
dent play that role, or at a minimum that the position be subject to Senate confirmation.
While these suggestions seem sound from an abstract management-theory perspective, I doubt that
reliance on Ed Meese or Dan Quayle would do much to solve the problem; while good people are not
sufficient, they are necessary. It is possible that these structural revisions would lead to changes in the
quality of personnel: if the Vice President and the Attorney General were required to play such
responsible roles, people like Quayle and Meese might not be chosen in the first place. Ultimately,
however, these reforms will only prove meaningful if Congress and the American public demand more
independent judgment and less political pandering from the Vice President and Attorney General. As
the Boland Amendment interpretation discussed above demonstrates, see supra note 43, the Attorney
General's office has often provided only self-serving and disingenuous interpretations of legal restric-
tions on the President.
46. Pp. 166-67.
47. Pp. 167-71.
48. George Mason explained that Congress should be assigned the war power because he was
"for clogging rather than facilitating war, [and] for facilitating peace." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 314 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966) (remarks of George Mason).
Similarly, James Wilson argued:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in
the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the
important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large . . . from this circum-
stance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national interest can draw us
into a war.
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 528 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1888) (remarks of James Wilson).
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dent, yet to get the most representative branch back into the picture it
appears that we must empower such a committee. Similarly, the legal ad-
viser, something of a "class representative" for Congress, would centralize
in a non-elected official responsibility that now rests dispersed among the
representatives.
The necessarily paradoxical nature of these reforms may suggest that
the Framers were simply mistaken in valuing Congress for its more delib-
erative process and more representative character. One lesson that might
be drawn from the history of the foreign affairs power is that no matter
how much power is assigned to Congress, the executive will ultimately
win out. The Framers' decision, first in the Articles of Confederation and
then in the Constitution, to assign the most important of the foreign af-
fairs powers to Congress rather than to the executive was a truly revolu-
tionary act. Never before had a legislative branch been granted the power
to declare war."9 History suggests that this may have been a failed
revolution.
But before abandoning the Framers' insight, it may be worthwhile to
delineate those types of foreign affairs issues with respect to which Con-
gress' deliberative procedures are advantageous. The United Nations and
other multilateral international bodies act in a manner at least as deliber-
ative as Congress, yet they are certainly able to address foreign policy
issues and to play a role in mediating and resolving international disputes.
Koh's suggestion that we streamline Congress in the foreign affairs field
may be more useful for those instances where immediate response is re-
quired than for broader policy questions demanding more sustained and
deliberative attention. Framework legislation may need to establish several
different "frameworks," adapted to fit the particular procedural needs of a
given set of foreign policy issues.
Koh also suggests a less structural but equally important reform: in-
creasing Congress' access to classified information. As Koh points out:
"Increased congressional exclusion from classified information has both
buttressed executive claims to superior knowledge in foreign affairs and
fostered uninformed legislative judgment in those decisions in which Con-
gress does participate."50 Here, of course, the oft-repeated objection is that
Congress cannot keep a secret (as if the executive can), to which Koh
responds by suggesting that access might be limited to the core consulta-
tive group. While this again raises the problem of centralizing power in a
less-than-representative body, it seems a reasonable compromise given the
need to maintain confidentiality."'
49. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 480-81 (1928).
50. P. 172.
51. Developments in the Iran-Contra trials only underscore the importance of this informational
reform. The only Iran-Contra trial against a CIA operative, Joseph Fernandez, was dismissed when
the CIA refused to allow disclosure at trial of classified (but already widely disseminated) information
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Perhaps the single most devastating blow to Congress' ability to oversee
the President's foreign affairs actions was the Supreme Court's invalida-
tion of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha.52 By holding that Congress
may not delegate power subject to review by a "veto" of one or both
Houses, Chadha removed an important oversight tool from the legislature.
Now, if Congress wants to stop any presidentially initiated action, it must
do so by a two-thirds majority of both Houses, since it will almost inevita-
bly face a veto. Presidential initiative in areas of disputed authority thus
creates a defacto shift in the balance of power. Were the President to go
to Congress for authorization before committing troops, for example, a
simple majority of one House could deny that approval. If the President
shoots first and asks for approval later, congressional disapproval requires
a two-thirds vote from both Houses. No wonder Presidents are trigger-
happy."3
The legislative veto allowed Congress to retain its approval authority
while simultaneously permitting the President to take policy initiatives. As
a substitute, Koh suggests broader use of fast-track approval."4 Under this
arrangement, which has been used in negotiating international trade
agreements, Congress authorizes the President to undertake negotiations
on the condition that the result of the negotiations be submitted to Con-
gress for final approval. Congress also commits to an expedited vote on
the policy initiative. In this way, Congress maintains its prerogative of
choosing to disapprove of an action by voting it down by a simple major-
ity, as it could with any legislation proposed by the President. At the same
about the existence of CIA bases in Central America. Because the CIA's own man was being prose-
cuted, and because the Iran-Contra prosecutions are not supported whole-heartedly by an administra-
tion headed by George Bush, see supra note 9, who has himself been charged as complicitous by
Admiral John Poindexter, there is at the very least a basis for suspecting that the executive branch is
using its power over classified information not to protect secrets, but to protect its own. Congressional
access to and oversight of classified information would provide a much needed check on the executive
branch's ability to forestall inquiries into its actions through manipulation of "secret" information.
52. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
53. It might be argued that Congress' power of the purse gives it the ability to disapprove of
presidential actions by a simple majority, by declining to appropriate funds. But this response is
demonstrably insufficient, as the history of the Vietnam War amply reveals. For many reasons, it is
unrealistic for Congress simply to cut off funds. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). Appropriations bills generally include a broad range of projects, and Congress has been
reluctant to decline to pass the whole bill on the basis of disagreement over individual items. For this
reason, Congress in the War Powers Act specifically directed courts not to construe appropriations as
authorizing military efforts without specific directions to that effect in the appropriations legislation.
50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (1982).
Cutting off funding, moreover, is clearly an insufficient response to quick strikes such as the inva-
sions of Panama and Grenada. At least in the war powers context, stopping the war once it has
started has proven next to impossible. The Framers sought to ensure that before any American lives
were put on the line, the most representative branch would determine that a military effort is neces-
sary. It seems likely, for example, that had the President put the question of invading Panama to
Congress in advance, he would have been hard-pressed to obtain approval. Once he had launched the
attack, however, virtually everyone rallied around the flag, and few Congresspersons voiced any
criticisms.
54. Pp. 176-77.
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time, the fast-track approval procedure allows the President to take policy
initiatives without shifting the burden to Congress to disapprove of his
actions by a two-thirds vote.55
Fast-track approval is obviously not foolproof. If, for example, Con-
gress amended the War Powers Act to require the President to submit for
fast-track approval any decision to take military action abroad, Presidents
probably would do just what they have done under the current
Act-frustrate its triggering mechanism by denying that they are engaging
in the type of military action described in the Act. Thus, the burden
would still be on Congress to stop the President from acting, and this
would require a two-thirds vote. In other words, the fast-track approval
procedure requires good-faith cooperation from the executive, something
history suggests will not be forthcoming. Because the lines of authority in
foreign affairs are almost always disputed, the executive has little incen-
tive to cooperate. The President can now control foreign affairs freely as
long as he or she can muster the support of one vote more than one-third
of either House.56 Without judicial definition and enforcement of the lines
of authority, fast-track approval is unlikely to alter this state of affairs.
An underlying limitation of all framework legislation is that it is, after
all, only legislation. Often designed to spur later Congresses to take action
in specified circumstances, it is not clear that later Congresses are bound
by a prior Congress' directives. There is no question that a later Congress
could repeal framework legislation. But could it simply ignore the legisla-
tion? This is not a theoretical problem. In the aftermath of crises like
Vietnam and Watergate, Congress enacted structural reforms to reassert
its proper role over the long term. But when it came time to confront a
specific foreign policy issue, Congress most often preferred to look the
other way. Thus, while it passed the War Powers Act over President
Nixon's veto, the only time Congress managed to assert that the Act was
triggered in a specific instance was with respect to Lebanon, and then it
could only produce sufficient votes to do so by simultaneously authorizing
continued deployment of U.S. forces for eighteen months.
57
55. Koh suggests two measures that can be combined with fast-track approval to allow Congress
to do battle with the executive with even fewer votes. Committee "gatekeeping" procedures allow a
majority of a committee to block a proposal before it reaches the floor, and are routinely used to
screen proposed legislation. P. 177. Similarly, point-of-order procedures allow individual members to
delay temporarily the consideration of bills. P. 177. Again, however, these mechanisms share the
problem posed by the core consultative committee; to render Congress powerful enough to stand up to
the President, they rely on less democratic procedures.
56. See supra note 37.
57. See 129 CONG. REC. H7593 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) (text of Joint Resolution). President
Reagan had sought authorization to deploy the troops in Lebanon for six months, but because the six
month period would have expired just before the 1982 congressional election, Congress gave him
eighteen months, "in order to avoid another authorization vote before the election." Cutler, The Con-
stitutional Sharing of the War Power, GEO. MASON L. REV., Fall 1988, at 221, 223.
Robert Turner offers several similar examples of congressional weakness. In the Mayaguez inci-
dent, which involved intense fighting and the death of at least thirty-eight marines, President Ford
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An even better example of Congress' nullification of its own enactments
is the National Emergencies Act (NEA),58 another of the post-Watergate
statutes designed to reassert Congress' proper role and to limit presiden-
tial power. When the Act was passed in 1976, four states of emergency,
including one declared in 1933, were still in effect, not because of any
then-existing emergencies, but simply because prior emergencies, had
never been terminated."' Under these states of emergency, the President
exercised "extraordinary" and "authoritarian" powers pursuant to some
470 emergency laws.60 In the NEA, Congress sought to create a procedure
that would assure periodic congressional oversight over all future states of
emergency.61 The statute established a procedure for terminating emer-
gencies declared by the President," under which Congress is required to
vote on a concurrent resolution "[n]ot later than six months after a na-
tional emergency is declared, and not later than the end of each six month
period thereafter that such emergency continues . . . . Congress consid-
declined to provide the required report under the War Powers Act and instead dispatched an informal
communication. Nonetheless, the Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed a resolution
praising President Ford for conduct "in the spirit" of the Act. Turner, supra note 2, at 111. When
President Carter initiated the doomed airlift of the Iranian hostages, however, the ranking Republican
on the Foreign Affairs Committee said his action violated the War Powers Act. Id. at 112. And when
President Reagan invaded Grenada, House Speaker Tip O'Neill initially called for War Powers Act
hearings, but backed off when it became dear that the invasion was popular among the American
people. Id.
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
59. See S. REP. No. 922, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976); 120 CONG. REc. 29976 (1974) (remarks
of Senator Church).
60. See S. REP. No. 922, supra note 59, at 18; 120 CONG. REc. 29976 (1974) (remarks of
Senator Church).
61. The legislative history is replete with spirited statements of the need to reassert congressional
responsibility in this area. For example, Senator Pearson stated: "Congressional review is essential to
checking the steady growth and accumulation of presidential emergency powers. We must insist upon
our role to oversee the use of these and to terminate them when conditions are proper." 120 CONG.
REC. 29984 (1974). Senator Ribicoff, introducing hearings on the NEA, was similarly adamant in his
observation that "enactment of the legislation would ... insure that the extraordinary powers which
now reside in the hands of the Chief Executive . . . could be utilized only when emergencies exist,
and then, only under safeguards provided by congressional review." National Emergencies Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 3884 Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1976). And Senator Church expressed much the same sentiment:
(W]e were principally concerned in establishing statutory procedures to govern future emer-
gencies that would insure Congress the proper legislative role. Presently . . . Congress has no
method to pass judgment as to the nature, the extent of the emergency, nor its duration. We
think that this bill remedies all of those present deficiencies in the law.
National Emergencies Act: Hearings on H.R. 3884 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Lau'
and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1975).
62. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)-(c) (1982). Congress changed the concurrent resolution to a joint resolu-
tion (which must be presented to the President for his veto and thus avoids Chadha problems) shortly
after the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a lawsuit challenging President Reagan's trade em-
bargo against Nicaragua. In this case we argued that the embargo was invalid because it was imposed
pursuant to a declaration of emergency under the National Emergencies Act, whose legislative veto
rendered the Act unconstitutional. See Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
63. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (1982). The statute also includes expedited procedures setting strict
deadlines for when the resolution shall be reported out of committee, taken up as business by the
originating House, referred to the appropriate committee of the other House, and finally acted upon
by both Houses. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(c) (1982).
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ered this six-month congressional review mandatory.64 The Senate Report
stated that "it should be clearly understood that Congress will not accept
any claim that an emergency is so severe that the President can act with-
out the congressional review required under this legislation."65
In practice, however, Congress has never voted on such a resolution,
even though the President has declared and continued for many years du-
bious "emergencies" with respect to Nicaragua, South Africa, Libya, and
Panama.6 Furthermore, in Beacon Products v. Reagan," a lawsuit chal-
lenging the continuation of the Nicaraguan emergency in the absence of a
congressional vote, the court of appeals concluded that no relief is availa-
ble if Congress simply fails to vote on a continuing emergency.
Thus, existing "framework legislation" has not controlled Congress,
much less the President. Congress ignores its own statutory dictates and
all too often takes the easy road of declining to take a position on action
that should not have begun without Congress' prior affirmative approval.
Presidents can and have routinely ignored framework legislation, and, by
seizing the initiative, have limited effective congressional action to those
measures upon which a two-thirds majority of both Houses can agree.
These facts of political life suggest that mere tinkering with legislative
procedures governing congressional-executive interaction is unlikely to
solve the problem.
Congress' repeated failure to live up to even its self-imposed demands
in foreign affairs indicates that the problem may be deeper than any
framework legislation can reach. Congress may simply not want to get
involved."8 If that is the case, Koh's modest proposal may be doomed from
the start, for it requires Congress to show at least enough interest to enact
framework legislation in the first place. Past legislative efforts in areas of
war powers, emergency authority, international agreements, and trade re-
lations could be viewed as evidence that Congress is interested in getting
involved, at least in the abstract. But viewed alongside Congress' abysmal
record in asserting its authority in specific instances, the evidence might
also be read more cynically to suggest that Congress is interested only in a
symbolic show of interest, to appease the public outcry that attends events
like Vietnam and the Iran-Contra affair.
If Congress is seeking merely to look good while ducking the issue,
64. See H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977) (under NEA, "each House must vote
.on whether to terminate the emergency"); S. REP. No. 1168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2288, 2291; 121 CONG. REc. 27635 (1975) (remarks of
Representative Anderson) ("Congress must consider whether the emergency should be terminated at
periodic intervals of every 6 months.").
65. S. REP. No. 922, supra note 59, at 10-11; S. REP. No. 1168, supra note 64, at 2, 5.
66. See Lobel, supra note 16, at 1415-16.
67. 814 F2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1987).
68. This in turn may be a reflection of the American public's general apathy about foreign affairs.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1990, at A14 ("one of the problems a lot of Congressmen say they're
havring is that foreign aid at this time is not a high priority for a lot of people").
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however, there is no reason to tolerate such evasion. It's not Congress'
choice; the Constitution allocates responsibilities as well as powers. But
whether one believes that Congress is shirking its responsibilities or that
the President has frustrated Congress' best efforts, the conclusion is the
same: the only structural solution with the promise of real change is in-
volvement by the judiciary.
III. DEFINING A JUDICIAL ROLE
Koh insists that the judiciary must be involved in the "shared power"
over foreign affairs, and suggests that Congress pass legislation designed
to override the doctrines by which courts have avoided addressing foreign
affairs disputes. 9 I agree that judicial involvement is crucial, and that
legislation must encourage such involvement. But here I believe Koh's
proposal is not modest enough. Paradoxically, unless the judicial role is
narrowly circumscribed in the first instance to enforcing procedures for
congressional-executive interaction, judicial involvement is unlikely to
prove meaningful.
As Professor Christopher May has argued, judicial involvement in
times of foreign affairs crises may be more damaging than judicial absten-
tion.70 In the past, the courts have responded to challenges to executive
action in foreign affairs in two ways. They have either declined to address
such challenges at all, dismissing them as nonjusticiable, or, where they
have reached the merits, they have simply rubber-stamped the President's
actions. The latter, more "involved" response may have more serious
long-term consequences because it gives in a time of emergency an impri-
matur of legitimacy to acts that might well be viewed as unlawful from a
sober second sight. Justice Jackson warned of this danger in a dissent
from Korematsu v. United States,71 in which the Court upheld the round-
up and detention of thousands of Japanese-Americans:
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution
to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for
all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in crimi-
nal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. . . A mili-
tary commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it
is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident
becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative
power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.72
69. Pp. 181-84.
70. C. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918
(1989).
71. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 246.
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As Korematsu demonstrates, without careful guidelines, judicial involve-
ment may only exacerbate the problem of extra-constitutional executive
power.
In two hundred years of executive encroachment on congressional pre-
rogative in matters touching on foreign affairs, one case stands out as a
high water mark for Koh: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.7 3 In
that case, the Supreme Court invalidated President Truman's unilateral
seizure of a steel mill, rejecting the President's claim that the seizure was
necessary for the national defense during the Korean War. Koh relies
heavily on this case as a statement of the substantive constitutional princi-
ples that should guide disputes concerning the separation of powers in
foreign affairs.7 4 Justice Jackson's concurrence, which has since been
adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court,7 5 sets forth a three-part test
for determining the legitimacy of presidential actions.76 The test turns on
what steps Congress has taken to assume or delegate authority, and thus
at its core it is based on a notion of shared power.
But at least as important as the substantive principles set forth in Jus-
tice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence is the precedent of judicial review
that the case exemplifies. Youngstown demonstrates that the courts have a
role in reviewing executive action, even where the executive relies on
claims of foreign affairs powers or national security. It is one of the very
few cases challenging executive action with foreign affairs implications
where the Court not only reached the merits, but ruled against the Presi-
dent and enjoined his action. It should come as no surprise, then, that Koh
returns again and again to Youngstown as his exemplar of judicial
responsibility.
If Youngstown is the Brown v. Board of Education77 of foreign affairs
litigation, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.7 8 is the Plessy v.
Ferguson.79 Curtiss-Wright is the paradigmatic example of the danger
posed by judicial review that Professor May describes. Reviewing a chal-
lenge to an executive prohibition on arms sales, the Court reached the
merits only to affirm executive action. Moreover, in doing so it provided
pages of broad dicta extolling the President's powers-language which
Presidents have relied on ever since. The case holds only that the Presi-
dent may prohibit arms sales to belligerents in a foreign country where
Congress has expressly authorized such a prohibition. Justice Sutherland's
dicta, however, goes much further, suggesting that the executive is the
73 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
74. Pp. 105-13.
75. Se, e g., Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659 (1989); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S, 654, 661-62, 668-69, 674 (1981).
76. 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78. 299 U.S, 304 (1936).
79. 163 U.S. 537 (1886).
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"sole organ" of the United States in foreign affairs and that the courts
have no place in reviewing, much less overturning, executive foreign pol-
icy actions.80
The Court in Youngstown refused to apply Curtiss-Wright's broad
dicta,8 ' but the Curtiss-Wright ethos continues to pervade the executive
branch, as reflected in its ubiquitous appearance in Justice Department
briefs."2 Koh points out, "[a]mong government attorneys, Justice Suther-
land's lavish description of the president's powers is so often quoted that it
has come to be known as the '"Curtiss-Wright, so I'm right" cite.' "83
And the judiciary's reluctance to provide any meaningful scrutiny in mod-
ern-day foreign affairs disputes has resurrected Curtiss-Wright in spirit, if
not in letter.
As noted above, the judiciary's responses to challenges to executive for-
eign policy actions have waffled between abstention and rubber-stamp ap-
proval. But there are signs of a nascent awareness that the judiciary has
an appropriate role to play in foreign affairs. Frequently, the court denies
relief in the case before it while stating that it would have a role to play in
a more egregious case. For example, in Crockett v. Reagan, 4 the district
court ruled that it lacked sufficient judicial standards to determine
whether the War Powers Act had been triggered by the dispatch of fifty-
five military advisers to El Salvador, but stated that the case would be
justiciable if there were more clear-cut, long-term "hostilities," as in
Vietnam. 5
Similarly, in Committee of U.S. Citizens Living In Nicaragua v. Rea-
gan,8' a suit challenging United States aid to the Contras as a violation of
the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v.
United States,"7 the court of appeals stated that if the aid had violated a
jus cogens norm-an international norm considered so fundamental that
it permits no abrogation under any circumstances-the court might have
enjoined even joint congressional-executive action. 8 In the case before it,
however, the court found that the particular norm violated-the obligation
to respect and follow a judgment of an international tribunal by whose
80. 299 U.S. at 319-20. Although Curtiss-Wright is often cited for the proposition that executive
foreign affairs actions are non-justiciable political questions, the Curtiss-Wright Court did reach the
merits of the issue.
81. See 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also American Int'l Group v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 438 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting Curtiss-Wright dicta).
82. P. 94 n.126.
83. P. 94.
84. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
85. 558 F. Supp. at 898.
86. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
87. 1986 I.C.J. 14.
88. 859 F.2d at 940-41. Examples of jus cogens norms include the customary human rights
prohibitions against torture, summary execution, prolonged arbitrary detention, genocide, and slavery.
Id.
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judgments a country had agreed to be bound-did not rise to the jus
cogens level.89
The Vietnam War cases also reflect this pattern.9" Again, the courts
provided no relief (with one short-lived exception91), but were unwilling
to write themselves out of the picture entirely. The judiciary grew mar-
ginally bolder as popular opposition to the war mounted. In the early
going, before popular opposition became manifest, the courts simply de-
clared the whole issue non-justiciable.92 In 1970, the courts began to hold
that the question whether Congress had authorized the war was justicia-
ble.93 In these cases, however, they found sufficient authorization in the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and subsequent appropriations, holding that
the "form" of congressional assent was a political question.94 And in the
final round of litigation, when popular and congressional opposition to the
war was at its peak, the courts reaffirmed that the question of authoriza-
tion was justiciable, refused to infer such authorization from the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution and appropriations, but held that the President should
be afforded wide latitude in deciding how to "wind down" the war.95
Thus, the courts have not accepted the executive's Curtiss-Wright argu-
ments wholesale, and instead have insisted that some judicial oversight is
appropriate (albeit always in another case). This pattern can be inter-
preted in at least two ways. On the one hand, the courts' dicta could be
construed as an attempt to rationalize and legitimate what is for all prac-
89. Id. at 942. The court treated plaintiffs' due process claim similarly. Plaintiffs alleged that the
government's appropriation of $100 million to a paramilitary force directed at them violated their
rights to due process. The court denied the claim, but specifically stated that:
[W]e decline to hold that Congress' "reckless" support for a foreign organization that harms
Americans could never deprive those Americans of their constitutional rights. But, before such
support could threaten a constitutional violation, the foreign organization's deliberate infliction
of harm upon Americans-as well as Congress' awareness of this pattern of abuse-would
have to be much clearer than appellants allege that it is in this case.
Id. at 952-53.
The Ninth Circuit issued a similarly ambivalent ruling in Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th
Cir. 1986). That suit, also litigated by the Center for Constitutional Rights, invoked the Ethics in
Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982), and sought to require the Attorney General to deter-
mine whether a Special Prosecutor should be appointed to investigate President Reagan and the Na-
tional Security Council for criminal violations of the Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1988), in
funding the Contras. Plaintiffs won in the district court. 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983). On
appeal, the court denied plaintiffs standing, but left open the possibility that members of the Judiciary
Committee of either House might have standing to seek such relief. 797 F.2d at 823.
90. The Vietnam War cases are explored in more detail in Ratner & Cole, supra note 27, at
730-35.
91. In Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 553, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), Judge Judd enjoined
the bombing of Cambodia because it was unauthorized by Congress. The Second Circuit stayed the
injunction, however, and ultimately reversed the decision sub nom. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
92. See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945
(1967); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).
93. See DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
94. DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1369; Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042-43; Berk, 429 F.2d at 305.
95. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484
F.2d at 1311.
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tical purposes judicial abdication. To abdicate altogether would be to hold
the rule of law inapplicable to a large part of what the executive does, and
thereby to delegitimize courts, to question the efficacy of the rule of law,
and to direct protests elsewhere, where they might be more explosive. It
would, in short, invite civil resistance.98 Thus, a cynic might read these
decisions as holding out an elusive carrot to maintain the facade of a legal
remedy and thereby derail forms of protest that would be more threaten-
ing to the establishment.
97
On the other hand, these statements could also be read less cynically as
a sign of genuine ambivalence. Judges in our society are assigned the re-
sponsibility of enforcing the law, and many judges may be reluctant to see
themselves as abdicating that responsibility in any context. It takes real
courage, however, to enforce the law against a President's foreign initia-
tive in the face of Congress' general unwillingness to challenge the Presi-
dent, the populace's often jingoistic support of such actions, and the
courts' history of abdication. By asserting that in another case they might
provide relief, judges assure themselves, as well as the public, that they
are playing a role, that they are not powerless, and that the law does pose
some limits even on foreign policy. 8
Both motivations probably play some part in the judicial response to
foreign affairs disputes. But while I may be falling prey to the same opti-
mism that has captured Koh, I believe judicial concern for the enforce-
96. Cf F. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1987) (con-
tending that in response to Reagan Administration's international lawlessness and Federal courts'
unwillingness to challenge it, "large numbers of American citizens have decided to act on their own
cognizance in order to demand that the Reagan administration adhere to the principles of interna-
tional law, of U.S. domestic law, and of our own Constitution in its conduct of foreign affairs"); see
also Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,
46-48 (1984) (section on civil disobedience).
97. In the same way that judicial dicta asserting the power to provide relief legitimizes judicial
abdication in the case at hand, so from a broader perspective the mere existence of Youngstown may
legitimize subsequent judicial deference. Courts and commentators can point to Youngstown for the
proposition that meaningful judicial review is possible, even as it is denied in case after case. Koh and
I may both be falling into this trap. But until Congress invites the courts to play a meaningful role,
we cannot know whether to write off the judiciary.
98. The assertion of judicial power in the abstract and the simultaneous refusal to apply it in the
case at hand is a familiar first step toward realizing that power in a specific case. The classic example
is Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in which Justice Marshall asserted the power
to enjoin executive action contrary to the Constitution while declining to exercise that power in the
immediate case. See also Toscanino v. United States, 500 F.2d 267, 273-76 (2d Cir. 1974) (declining
to invalidate criminal trial because of manner in which defendant was brought to trial, but asserting
that if Federal agents act particularly egregiously, invalidation would be appropriate); cf. Lobel, The
Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Poliy and International Law, 71 VA. L.
REV. 1071, 1153-66 (1985) (urging courts to declare presidential action unlawful even where they
are unwilling to provide injunctive relief).
Such abstract assertions of judicial power, like Congress's passage of framework legislation, could
be interpreted cynically as empty rhetoric, but the rhetoric may also serve two functions: (1) to build a
record of dicta, so that when a court does take the courageous step, it will have a certain level of
precedent upon which to rely; and (2) to restrain the executive at least minimally, by threatening to
intervene should it engage in particulary egregious action. As long as there is the possibility of judicial
sanction, some level of deterrence probably operates.
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ment of law provides a ray of hope. If a properly circumscribed role could
be articulated for the courts, they might be willing to assume it. Judicial
participation, furthermore, is crucial. As demonstrated above, the execu-
tive's strengths and Congress' weaknesses virtually assure that the execu-
tive will prevail as long as all it has to worry about is surviving an over-
ride vote. The Framers were not satisfied with establishing a balance of
power solely between Congress and the executive; they created a tripartite
system of checks and balances. Without the judiciary's input, the system
simply cannot work.
Koh's most important suggestions are therefore those designed to in-
volve the judiciary in regulating foreign affairs decision-making. Koh
urges Congress to pass legislation to "override the abstention doctrines
that the courts have wrapped around themselves." '99 He recommends that
the legislation specify "particular plaintiffs, defendants, claims, and forms
of relief that would be properly subject to adjudication."' 0 The sugges-
tion that the courts be nudged into the fray through framework legislation
is a good one. As deferential as the courts are to the President, they are
also deferential to Congress. In many foreign affairs cases, Congress has
not acted, or has acted ambiguously, and the courts are faced with decid-
ing whether to confront the President where Congress has not. Were Con-
gress to state clearly that the courts should play a role in a given type of
dispute, it would be much more difficult for the courts to bow out. As the
Supreme Court said recently, "unless Congress specifically has provided
otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the au-
thority of the Executive in military and national security affairs."''1 1 And
in Youngstown, it should be recalled, Congress had expressly repudiated
President Truman's request to authorize seizure of the steel mills.
Koh's suggestion that judicial participation be encouraged by legisla-
tion, however, does not address the risk that once the courts are involved,
they may only legitimate and rationalize executive encroachments on leg-
islative prerogatives. Other than Youngstown, the judiciary's modern-day
record on challenging executive foreign affairs actions is disastrous. As
Koh and Professor May have both ably demonstrated, when the courts
reach the merits, they almost invariably uphold executive action.'0 2 May
speculates that this may be because courts get caught up in the "crisis" of
the moment, and, like Congress and the American public, they are content
to rely on the President at such times.' 0 3 May suggests that courts should
99. P. 182 (emphasis omitted).
100. P. 182.
101. Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (emphasis added).
102. Pp. 134-46; C. MAY, supra note 70.
103. C. MAY, supra note 70, at 257-59. Professor May is among distinguished company in this
analysis. Justice Jackson noted that during wartime, the Constitution "is interpreted by judges under
the influence of the same passions and pressures" that affect the public at large. Woods v. Cloyd W.
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). Learned Hand similarly remarked,
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use prudential avoidance techniques to delay deciding such disputes until
the crisis is over and clearer heads can prevail."0 4 But this solution is un-
satisfactory where, as is often the case, a plaintiff seeks immediate redress
from irreparable harm.
A more realistic solution would be to circumscribe the nature of the
remedy, at least in the first instance. Recognizing that courts are reluctant
to second-guess the merits of particular substantive policy decisions by the
President, Congress should authorize the courts to play the role of proce-
dural referee rather than fully engaged combatant. The judiciary's func-
tion should be to ensure that the processes established by Congress in its
framework legislation (and ultimately by the Constitution) are followed,
and that Congress' constitutional role is not eviscerated by presidential
initiatives and congressional disincentives that short-circuit those
processes. If the courts are asked only to ensure that the democratic
processes of decision-making are followed, they may be less deferential
than where they are asked to enjoin the President's action altogether." 5
Thus, while I agree with Koh's assessment that Congress should ex-
pressly invite judicial involvement, I believe that the terms of the invita-
tion must make clear that the court's principal function is to require Con-
gress and the President to comply with procedures for inter-branch
discussing the World War I sedition cases, that "the Nine Elder Statesmen, have not shown them-
selves wholly immune from the 'herd instinct.'" Letter from L. Hand to Z. Chafee (Jan. 2, 1921),
quoted in Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of Histoty, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 770 (1975).
104. C. MAY, supra note 70, at 270-75.
105. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983) (dispute concerning constitutional
process for legislative action is justiciable). There is some support in the history of the Center for
Constitutional Rights' foreign affairs litigation for the common-sense notion that the courts are more
likely to provide relief to the extent that the relief is circumscribed. When we sought to enjoin aid to
the Contras as a violation of the War Powers Clause, the court found the claim non-justiciable as a
matter of "equitable discretion." Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But
when we sought solely to have the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation to determine
whether the President had violated a criminal law by aiding the Contras without congressional ap-
proval, we were successful in the district court, and lost in the court of appeals only on standing
grounds. Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983), motion to reconsider denied, 577 F.
Supp. 1449 (N.D. Cal. 1984), res'd, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
Similarly, when we sought to require removal of the military advisers from El Salvador, the courts
found the case non-justiciable. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But when we
challenged aid to El Salvador on the ground that the President had improperly used a pocket veto to
block legislation barring such aid absent a certification of improvement in the human rights situation
there, we prevailed at the court of appeals level. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The
Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot only because the legislation at issue had terminated by its
own terms. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); see also Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th
Cir. 1984) (refusing to review merits of presidential investigation into circumstances of U.S. citizen
detained abroad, but stating that if executive simply refused to conduct investigation, court could
require executive to conduct one).
Regan '. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), also supports this point. In that case, plaintiffs challenged a
ban on travel to Cuba, but asked the Court only to require the President to declare an emergency
under National Emergency Act procedures if he sought to continue the ban. Thus, plaintiffs sought to
mandate executive participation in a dialogic procedure established by framework legislation. Plain-
tiffs were successful in the court of appeals, Wald '. Reagan, 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983), and
received four votes in the Supreme Court. 468 U.S. 222. That is the closest the Court has come since
Youngstown to invalidating executive action in foreign affairs.
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dialogue set forth in the framework legislation itself. Where Koh would
rely on the courts to enjoin unilateral executive action, I would ask them
merely to require the President or Congress to take the next step in the
procedure established by statute-be it a presidential report, a finding, or
a congressional vote. Framework legislation should be drawn up with this
limited judicial role in mind, by specifying particular procedures and au-
thorizing standing to members of Congress or the public to challenge ex-
ecutive or congressional failure to follow the prescribed procedures.
Of course, if Congress or the President ignore the court's procedural
mandate, we are back at square one. But we may never reach that point;
there is nothing to suggest that either body would ignore a clear judicial
mandate. If they were to ignore the court, a substantive injunction would
then be appropriate, and at that point a court might be more willing to
grant such an injunction. By taking the procedural route first, the court
would have given the representative branches a clear opportunity to exer-
cise their responsibilities, and ultimate responsibility would therefore re-
main with those branches. And by issuing a procedural mandate, the court
would have entered the fray, making its later abdication more difficult.
There is arguably room for such a circumscribed judicial role in some
existing framework legislation. For example, Michael Ratner and I have
suggested that where military action extends beyond the War Powers
Act's sixty-day period, the courts should play a "triggering" role."°6
Rather than enjoining the challenged military action in the first instance,
a court finding a War Powers Act violation could declare that the Act's
sixty-day period has begun as of the date of the court's decision, thereby
forcing the President to seek affirmative approval from Congress if the
two branches agree that the action should continue. More recently, Pro-
fessor John Hart Ely has recommended, in light of the history of judicial
unwillingness to play even that limited role absent an explicit legislative
invitation, that Congress should amend the War Powers Act expressly to
authorize the judiciary to play such a triggering role.'
If framework legislation in the area of foreign affairs is to work, the
judiciary should be authorized to play a similar "referee" role over all
such legislation. To the extent possible, the event that triggers the legisla-
tion's procedural requirements should be an objective set of circumstances
and should not be left to the discretion or judgment of the President or
Congress. Such a framework would allow the President to take initiatives
without necessarily shifting the burden to Congress to disapprove by a
two-thirds majority, because the judiciary would be available to require
the President to seek affirmative congressional approval. This proposal
106. Ratner & Cole, supra note 27, at 757-58.
107. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379,
1406-17 (1988).
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recognizes that presidential initiatives may be inevitable, while retaining
Congress' prerogative to halt such initiatives where it does not affirma-
tively approve of the President's action. Similarly, the courts would be
available to require Congress to follow the procedural requirements it im-
poses on itself, as in the National Emergencies Act.
This proposed limitation on the judiciary's role is also responsive to
concerns about the judiciary's countermajoritarian character, which may
at least in part explain the courts' reluctance to enjoin presidential action.
Where the courts are asked to halt a presidential foreign policy initiative
that Congress has not taken upon itself to stop, the courts might well be
reluctant to impose their non-representative will. But where the relief au-
thorized simply asks the court to require a dialogue between the two rep-
resentative branches, the court furthers rather than disrupts the demo-
cratic process.' 08 If Congress chooses to approve of a presidential
initiative, it will need to do so on the record, not by avoiding the issue as
it did for years during the Vietnam War. Thus, this suggested judicial
role would not only make the President more accountable to Congress, but
would also make members of Congress more accountable to their
electorate.
IV. CONCLUSION
In foreign affairs, conservatives generally argue for flexibility over for-
mal adherence to the Constitution, particularly where adherence to the
Constitution might constrain the President.'09 They emphasize that in the
modern world the nation will be more effective and efficient if the Presi-
dent has a free hand in conducting external affairs. But the pursuit of
efficiency potentially knows no limits. It would be more efficient, and we
might well be more effective internationally, if the President were as-
signed dictatorial powers. The Framers no doubt recognized that an impe-
rial executive was an effective and efficient way to run a government. But
they also realized that it is not the way to run a democracy. 10 The test is
to square our internal democratic principles with the conduct of our for-
eign affairs. It is a test we have all too often failed. The Framers sug-
gested that the best way to succeed would be to assign responsibility for
our most important external decisions to the most representative branch.
Others have argued that the foreign affairs power will only be consistent
with democratic principles when we adopt a foreign policy that is substan-
tively true to those principles, that is, not imperialist."' Koh's most valua-
108. Cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (countermajoritarian judicial review most
legitimate where its purpose is to protect and further democratic processes of government).
109. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 3, at 415 (A. Hamilton) (comparing Presi-
dent's powers to those of King of England).
111. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 16, at 1424-33.
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ble insight is that one way to get there might be to return as a matter of
process to the democratic principles that led the Framers to require that
foreign affairs, like domestic affairs, be the product of the representative
branches' shared powers. Such a return will be possible, however, only if
Congress inscribes a properly limited role for the judiciary. If the courts
were to begin to play a role of ensuring that legal processes are not by-
passed for political ends, perhaps we would eventually stop sacrificing
democratic principles (both our own and those of other countries) for self-
interested external goals.

